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ABSTRACT 
Using a theoretical model, we examine both the relationship between a downstream dominant 
firm’s market share and an upstream monopoly’s Lerner index and the relationship between 
upstream and downstream price elasticities of demand, in a regulated industry context.  We 
undertake an empirical study that confirms our theoretical predictions, namely that the market 
share of a leader downstream firm is significant in explaining the upstream producers’ Lerner 
indexes. Also in accordance with the results of the theoretical model, the Lerner index is 
negatively influenced by the competition that suppliers face and by the level of economies of 
density, amongst other variables.   
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A basic result of classical economics theory is that a monopolist’s Lerner index equals the 
inverse of the price elasticity of demand. This means that the higher the consumers’ reaction 
to changes in prices, the less the market power of the monopolist. This also means that the 
consumers, who, in a free market context are individually price-takers are the only limit that 
monopolists face to increase prices above their marginal costs. This result is valid under the 
conditions of a monopoly selling to a large number of consumers, and attempts to measure the 
monopolist’s degree of market power.
1  
But pure monopoly situations where the players are a single producer and numerous price-
taker consumers are scarce in the real world. Indeed, real market situations are more complex 
than the simple case for which the Lerner index is computed. Let us consider, for example, 
the case of network industries. With the privatization and liberalization of many network 
industries, a few firms entered the market, as happened in telecommunications, energy and 
transport operations, while the main network remains as a natural monopoly.Also, networks 
or main infrastructure suppliers sometimes have new competitors, as in the case of mobile 
telecommunications, ports and airports. These new firms cannot be considered as price takers. 
Rather, they face imperfect competition.  
In particular, airports are often monopolies or oligopolies that sell their facilities to airlines 
which compete amongst themselves as oligopolists. Thus, the downstream airlines may have 
the capacity to limit the upstream airports’ monopoly (or oligopoly) power and profits.   
Literature  on  the  influence  of  the  buyers’  market  power  on  the  upstream  market  power 
(measured by the Lerner index) is scarce and presents several limitations. The purpose of this 
paper is to go some way in filling this gap, both theoretically and empirically. We develop 
new  theoretical  relations  between  a  downstream  dominant  firm’s  market  share  and  an 
upstream  monopoly’s  Lerner  index  and  also  between  upstream  and  downstream  price 
elasticities of demand.  
Our empirical study is based on a sample of 106 large airports all over the world.  As we deal 
with airport prices, it should be noted that these prices are usually regulated. The same applies 
to other industries, such as telecommunications or energy networks where the access price is 
regulated. These cases are similar because in fact airport charges are access prices, or prices 
                                                           
1 Theoretical literature also adds a version of the Lerner index for a Cournot oligopoly, equal 
to the ratio of the firm’s market share to the price elasticity of demand.  
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that  other  firms  (airlines)  pay  to  use  the  infrastructure.  If  regulation  strictly  followed 
theoretical  findings,  there  would  either  be  zero  profits  and  positive  Lerner  indexes  if  the 
upstream firm is a natural monopoly, or positive profits and Lerner indexes equal to zero, if it 
is a non-natural monopolist.   
However, our data reveals positive Lerner indexes and positive profits for 97 and 99 per cent 
of the airports, respectively. This means that there is a positive price cost margin, along with 
positive profits, even for regulated firms. We develop arguments to explain why this happens 
for  regulated  firms.  One  of  these  explanations  is  the  “capture”  of  the  regulator  by  the 
regulated  firm.  Our  results  support  the  idea  that  the  higher  the  market  share  of  the 
downstream buyer, the lesser the degree of “capture” of the regulator by the regulated airport.  
Our empirical study finds that the market share of a leader downstream firm is significant in 
explaining the upstream producers’ Lerner indexes. In particular, an increase in that market 
share of 10 points decreases the absolute value of the Lerner index by 2.3 basis points, which 
means a decrease in the Lerner index above 2.3% if we take into consideration its theoretical 
maximum value (1.0) and a decrease of 5.5% if we take as reference a Lerner index equal to 
the median of our sample (0.41).  
As expected, and given the results of the theoretical model, our empirical study also reveals 
that  the  Lerner  index  is  negatively  influenced  by  the  competition  that  suppliers  face,  the 
proportion  of  aeronautical  revenues  and  the  number  of  passengers  per  square  meter  of 
terminal area (which tests economies of density). The  Lerner index is lower in European 
airports and when the dominant airline is a low cost carrier. On the other hand, the variable 
used to test the impact of airports’ economies of scale in the long run (number of passengers) 
has a positive but insignificant effect on the index Lerner of the airports. Our estimates are 
consistent according the endogeneity test of Hausman.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical background for our main 
hypothesis. Section 3 presents the empirical study. The main conclusions are summarized in 
Section 4.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
A small number of papers had shown evidence of a negative relationship between the buyers’ 
concentration  ratio  (BCR)  and  the  upstream  gross  price  cost  margin  (Lustgarten,  1975; 
McGuckin and Chen, 1976; LaFrance, 1979). Feinberg (1980), in a test for 295 industries in  
 
4 
the United States, uses the ratio of upstream concentration coefficient for the first largest 
firms (CR4) to BRC, and correlates this ratio with the Lerner index, obtaining a positive 
correlation coefficient of 0.22. Moreover, this author finds a value of -0.28 for the correlation 
coefficient between the Lerner index and BCR. 
Other tests on the relation between the Lerner index and the industry structure have been 
performed for the banking industry. Maudos and Solis (2010) find values for the Lerner Index 
and  the  Panzar  and  Rosse’s  H-Statistic  that  support  the  hypothesis  of  monopolistic 
competition in the Mexican banking industry. But the buyers’ market concentration is absent 
from their study. Moreover, the banking industry is a rather free market and not regulated (in 
the Industrial Organization context). 
Hervani (2005) measures the oligopsony market power for the old newspapers market in the 
United States and finds evidence of the existence of oligopsony elements in this industry. The 
author also finds a negative correlation between the oligopoly/oligopsony index and of its 
impact on upstream prices, which were found to be positive or negative, depending on the 
period and on the region.  
Ellison and Snyder (2010), using data for antibiotics in the United States, conclude that large 
buyers may obtain discounts from sellers using their countervailing power. But this power can 
only be exerted when there is competition amongst sellers. 
Our study clearly separates the upstream and the downstream market concentration by using 
different variables which prove to be significant and have the expected sign. Moreover, by 
separating variables, and not using a combined oligopoly/oligopsony index, we obtain the size 
of the impact of each market structure.  
Also, our model specification is built on the assumption of a dominant firm in the downstream 
market  (a  Stackelberg  leader),  and  measures  the  buyer’s  market  power  of  this  firm, 
disregarding  concentration  coefficients  that  have  proved  to  be  not  comparable  across 
industries  and,  generally,  across  observations
2.  Thus,  neither  CR4  nor  the 
oligopoly/oligopsony ratio (which are based on concentration ratios) are adequate to measure 
downstream  market  power,  and  the  share  of  the  dominant  firm  is  a better  proxy  for  this 
purpose.  
                                                           
2 It is a standard result of industrial Organization literature that industries may have an identical CR4 and a very 
different concentration pattern.  
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Several  other  empirical  studies
3  supported  evidence  for  two  hypotheses  concerning  the 
limitation on sellers’ market power imposed from the buyers’ side, in a cross section analysis 
of  industries:  (i)  upstream  profit  rates  are  negatively  correlated  with  downstream 
concentration, and (ii) this effect is more relevant when the upstream industry has a high 
concentration ratio. 
Our case falls into both of the above-mentioned hypotheses. The second one fits our empirical 
study, as airports often none or few competitors. The same is true for networks supplying 
access to firms that provide operations (telecommunications, energy, railways). Therefore, we 
are dealing with industries where the concentration is high on the sellers’ side, but can also be 
high downstream. 
Our paper also deals with upstream industries that are regulated or publicly-owned. Newmark 
(1988)  finds  evidence  that  the  negative  relation  between  price-cost  margins  and  buyers’ 
concentration (measured by the concentration ration for the first four firms) is no longer valid 
for firms under government control or regulation. However, there is an important specificity 
in Newarks’ study. The author considers the proportion of sales under administrative control 
as the proxy for government control or regulation. This procedure seems adequate for the 
author’s  example  (defense  industries),  or  even  for  some  agricultural  products,  but  it  is 
certainly not the case of networks, ports and airports. Rather, in these industries, sales are not 
administratively controlled, but prices (or other variables) are defined by regulators.  
Our  paper  differs  from  Ellison  and  Snyder’s  (2010)  in  that  we  do  not  analyse  price 
discrimination but downstream market power in a context of upstream regulated industries. 
Moreover,  we  do  not  find  that  competition  amongst  sellers  is  a  necessary  condition  for 
downstream market power limits to sellers’ profits. 
In  brief,  our  paper  adds  to  the  previous  literature  as  it  develops  an  empirical  study  with 
variables that separate the effects of upstream and downstream market power and are, in our 
view,  better  proxies  for  the  upstream  and  downstream  market  power  and  allows  for  a 
dominant  downstream  firm.  Moreover,  our  paper  provides  theoretical  justifications  of  the 
main and control variables we use, which are important features that are not present in other 
studies, which are built on a rather ad hoc basis.    
In the following section we provide a description of the markets we consider in our study and 
show some results that provide the theoretical support of our empirical analysis. 
                                                           
3 See Ellison and Snyder (2010) for references.   
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(i) The Model Architecture 
In our model we consider two markets that are vertically related. In the downstream market, a 
small number of firms operate, buying some input from the upstream supplier, at price P. A 
natural monopoly operates in the upstream market. In the downstream market there are n+1 
firms playing a Stackelberg game. For simplicity we assume that all the n+1 firms have a 
constant and identical marginal cost which is the price, P, they pay the upstream monopoly 
for the input. Also, for the sake of simplicity, we suppose that the production function is qi=Xi 
(i=1,2,…,n+1),where X denotes the input quantity. A standard result of the equal marginal 
costs assumption is that all the followers will produce the same quantity qj (j=1,2,…,n) while 
the leader will produce qD, qD>qj. 
The input X is produced by a regulated natural monopoly. A well known result in literature is 
that the price the regulator imposes on this firm is superior to marginal cost, allowing for a 
positive Lerner index. Let the monopoly have a cost function with the form c(q) = cq+F, 
where c is its constant marginal cost and F is its fixed cost and q the total amount of the input 
bought by the downstream firms.  
In the downstream market, for any follower, for instance, for firm i, profits are represented by 
i i j i D i Pq q q n q q p - - + + = )) ) 1 ( ( p . In the third stage of the game, the followers maximise 
their profits, and, as they produce the same quantity, any of the followers’ best reply function 
has the expression:  ). ( D i i q q q =  
In  the  second  stage,  the  leader  maximizes  its  profits,  ). ), ( ( P q nq q D i D D + p   Solving  the 
leader’s first order condition, we get the derived demand of the upstream firm q(P). The 
upstream monopoly is regulated with a price cap, P, P< Pm, where Pm stands for the profit 
maximising price. In the first stage, the regulator announces the value of P, and the total 
quantity, q, is subsequently determined.  
(ii) The impact of downstream leader’s market share 
Within these conditions we may state the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The upstream firm’s profit depends negatively on the downstream leader’s 
market share.  
Proof: The leader’s first order condition is: 
(
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Let sD be the leader’s market share.  Considering that 
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where e stands for the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand, and sD = sD (P). 
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From the leader’s best reply function: 
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So that P-p is negative, as 
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As, in absolute values,   
   
   
<1, 
   
   < 0. Also, we may consider P(sD), the inverse function 
of sD (P), with 
  
   
< 0. 
The airport’s profit is πA= (P-c)(qD+nqi(qD))-F, where F is a fixed cost. As P<Pm,  
   
   > 0.  
Let πA= πA(P(sD)). Then,  
   
   
=
   
  
  
   
<0. 
Therefore the downstream market power negatively influences the upstream firm’s profits. 
Also, the price cost margin, 
   
  , depends positively on P, and, as  
  
   
< 0,  ,negatively on sD.  
 
(iii) Other Results  
In order to give some theoretical support to the control variables used in our empirical study 
and to their expected signs, we now establish other theoretical results.  Propositions 2 and 3 
refer to conditions for variables used as proxies for quantities and for the price elasticity of 
demand. Other variables, like the upstream market structure and the origin of revenues, need 
less explanation, as either they are commonly accepted by literature or they have been shown 
elsewhere as related to the Lerner index, or to some variables on which this index depends.  
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There is some empirical literature that suggests that profits and productivity may depend on 
the firm’s size. Vasigh and Hamzaee (1998) have found a positive and significant correlation 
between airports’ operating revenues and size. Oum et al. (2003) found that the productivity 
of airports is positively correlated with size, thus suggesting the existence of economies of 
scale, and negatively correlated with the percentage of international traffic and with the share 
of aeronautical revenues. Oum et al. (2004) confirm the same relationship both for capital 
productivity  and total  factor productivity.  But neither productivity nor  operating revenues 
reflect real market power.  
We need to show that the quantity a firm produces negatively influences the Lerner index. We 
do that in the context of a natural monopoly. 
Proposition 2: For a regulated natural monopoly, in the short run the Lerner index decreases 
with the quantity.  
Proof: Let  πA= (P-c)(q(P))-F. The regulator maximizes the monopoly’s profit, subject to the 
constraint πA = 0. The lagrangean is: 
= CS + (P-c)q(P)-F+λ((P-c)q(P)-F) where CS is the consumer surplus, and 
   
   = − . 
One of the first order conditions,  
 ℒ
   = 0, may be written as    =
   
   , where L is the Lerner 
index,   =
   
   , e is the price elasticity of demand and λ the Lagrange multiplier. The other 
first order condition is 
 ℒ
   = 0, or   −   = 
 
  . As L increases with P-c, it also increases with  
 
  and decreases with q. 
Notice that this conclusion is valid for a fixed amount of capital. As airports seldom change 
their capacity, it seems more appropriate to analyze these economies of density than long run 
effects.  
An  inverse  measure  of 
 
  may  be  any  variable  that  assesses  the  ratio  of  the  number  of 
passengers by any measure of capacity and the Lerner index should depend negatively on this 
variable.   
The Lerner index also depends on the price elasticity of demand and on the firm’s market 
share. The higher this market share is, the higher the Lerner index will be
4. It is sometimes 
                                                           
4 In an oligopoly, with n identical firms, the Lerner index of any firm is equal to the ratio of the firms share to the 
price elasticity of demand. This is a well-known result.  
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difficult to compute the price elasticity of demand. In the case of our empirical study, there 
are no  estimates for the price elasticities of airports, but only for the  price elasticities of 
airlines. However we can find the relationship between the price elasticities of demand of an 
upstream and a downstream firm. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose there is only one 
firm in any of two vertically related markets. 
Suppose the downstream firm charges consumers the price p, and sells the quantity q, with a 
downward sloping demand p(q), and has a constant marginal cost, c. Additionally, it pays a 
price P to an upstream firm, for every unit of the input, X. Assume also that the production 
function is such that one unit of output uses one unit of the input X. Under these assumptions, 
we may establish the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: When the downstream demand is linear or concave, the upstream firm’s Lerner 
index depends negatively on the downstream firm’s price elasticity.  
Proof: Let E and e be, respectively, the upstream’s and the downstream’s price elasticity of 
demand. 
The downstream firm’s profits are πd = p(q)q-(P+c)q. The inverse of its demand elasticity 
may be written as 
 
  =
 ′( ) 
 ( )  and, as the downstream firm is a monopolist, 
 
  =
 ( )  
 ( ) . The first 
order condition of profit maximization is: p’(q)q+p(q)-(c+P)=0, which yields the upstream 
firm’s derived demand: P = p’(q)q+p(q)-c. 
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derivative of E with respect to e, 
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(    )  has the sign of -A. then: 
1)  If p’’(q)<0, or if the demand function is strictly concave, E grows with e, and E>e. 
2)  If the demand function is linear, E=e. 
3)  If the demand function is strictly convex, E<e, and E decreases with e. 
Thus, in the first two  cases, the upstream firm’s  Lerner index depends negatively on the 
downstream firm’s price elasticity. 
It is not possible to find a measure of airlines’ price elasticity of demand for every observation 
in our data. Literature on air transport has found that price elasticity of demand is higher for  
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business  than  for  leisure  passengers
5.  But  data  on  these  two  types  of  passengers  is  not 
available either. Based on surveys of air travel elasticity studies for several countries, Gillen 
et al. (2003) find that long-haul international passengers, both “business” and “leisure”, have 
a lower elasticity than the short-haul and domestic passengers of both  demand segments. 
IATA  (2008)  also  reports  that,  according  to  a  review  of  research,  long-haul  international 
demand has a lower elasticity. This is confirmed by either route level, national level and 
supranational  level  studies.  According  to  the  above  references,  it  seems  appropriate  to 
consider the percentage of international passengers as a proxy for elasticity.   
The variables on which the Lerner index may depend, and for which we find appropriate 
proxies in the next section (the downstream leader’s market share, the upstream firm market 
share, the price elasticity of demand, and the quantity) are valid for any industry. We will now 
refer to three control variables that are specific to the case of airports. 
The first one is related to the origin of the airports’ revenues. Zhang and Zhang (1997) found 
that when marginal cost pricing is imposed on concession revenues social welfare is lower. 
Thus (and considering a dual till regime) a higher share of concession revenues (or lower 
share of aeronautical revenues) should have a positive effect on the Lerner index.  
The second one is related to the fact that literature has shown that low cost carriers (LCCs) 
often dominate secondary airports (some of which are in our data base), and try to negotiate in 
order to obtain lower aeronautical fares. This also applies to other airports where LCCs have 
large market shares
6. Thus, airports dominated by a LCC should have lower Lerner indexes.  
The third one is ownership. It is expected that airports that are publicly-owned have lower 
Lerner indexes. 
 
3. Empirical study 
3.1. Dataset and regulation 
Our data was collected from ATRS (2009) and is for 2007, for all observations. Additionally, 
we  use  IATA  (2010),  an  airport  locator  which  yields  the  distance  between  two  airports. 
According  to  IATA’s  geographical  classification,  26%  of  the  airports  in  the  sample  are 
located in Asia & Pacific, 44% in the United States and Canada and 30% in Europe. 
                                                           
5 For a complete study on business and leisure travelers’ elasticities, see Oum et al. (1992). 
6 See Barbot (2006).   
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Airports (like other upstream firms) are often regulated and it is therefore important to justify 
the use of the Lerner index in a sample of regulated firms. If regulation in practice might 
strictly follow theoretical findings,  either there  would be zero profits  and positive  Lerner 
indexes, if the upstream firm is a natural monopolist, or positive profits but Lerner indexes 
equal to zero, if it is a non-natural monopolist.  If the regulator strictly behaves as stated by 
theory, for each firm either the Lerner indexes or the profits should be zero. However, our 
data shows the existence of positive Lerner indexes (in 97 per cent of the observations) and of 
positive profits (in 99 per cent of the observations)
7. There are some reasons which explain 
why regulation in practice can lead to this empirical evidence. These arguments that can be 
grouped in three types: 
(i) The regulator’s aims: If theory dictates that prices should equal average and marginal cost, 
for natural and non-natural monopolies respectively, in practice the aim may not be achieved 
by the regulator, for several reasons. 
Firstly, it is difficult to know if a firm is a natural monopoly. Sometimes they are taken as 
such  on  common  sense  beliefs,  such  as  that  all  networks  or  all  large  firms  are  natural 
monopolies. The detection of natural monopolies needs to be based on solid analysis of cost 
functions, which are sometimes difficult to build. Thus the regulator may be using a simple 
Ramsey price for a non-natural monopoly, as she supposes (but is not sure) that she is dealing 
with this kind of monopoly. 
Secondly, some of these large upstream firms are not exactly regulated, as they are publicly 
owned and governments establish a reasonable price, but not effective regulation. In these 
cases the process of regulation is not well defined. As an example, in our sample, 65 per cent 
of the airports are wholly owned by public entities. 
Thirdly,  regulators  may  be  myopic  and  ignore  a  good  number  of  competitive  conditions 
within  which  the  firm  operates  and  which  influence  their  prices.  Parallel  or  downstream 
competition,  or  even  competition  from  other  markets  of  imperfect  substitutes  or  of 
complements, is often ignored by regulators. It has been shown that the Ramsey rule changes 
when there is competition even from different firms operating in different markets (Prieger, 
1995). 
                                                           
7 There should be more positive Lerner indexes than net profits. The discrepancy is due to the difference in the 
number of observations for each variable.  
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 (ii) Regulation process: To the well known argument of information asymmetry between the 
regulator and the regulated firm, which is present in the COS (cost of service) regulation, but 
also in price capping, and which leads to higher price cost margins, we add a few issues that 
can lead to positive price cost margins and profits. 
The process of regulation is unclear when it comes to the initial price. As De Fraja and Iozzi 
(2000) point out, the determination of price that should be set in the first regulation period, 
has  received  little,  if  any,  attention  from  literature,  which  has  concentrated  more  in  the 
adjustment  mechanism  of  capped  prices.  This  is  not  surprising  as  it  is  difficult  to  know 
marginal costs. In general, it is the initial price that is used, and that is subject to a posterior 
adjustment mechanism. In practice, price may not be equal or even close to marginal cost. 
Regulation is a process that takes time and includes the consultation of stakeholders. Some of 
the stakeholders have market power, like dominant airlines in regulated airports or telephone 
operators that buy access to networks. The more market power these stakeholders have, the 
stronger their lobby to lower the regulated price.  
(iii) Post regulation choice: After a price cap has been set, the regulated firm may set a price 





3.2 Regression Analysis 
We tested the two following equations:
10 
L = C+β1CR1+β2PAX+β3WAR+β4INT+β5PTER+β6LCC+ β7OWN+β8EUR+    [1] 
and 
L = C+β1CR1
2+β2PAX+β3WAR+β4INT+β5PTER+β6LCC+ β7OWN+β8EUR+  [2] 
The second specification intends to investigate if the influence of the downstream leader’s 
market share is better captured in a non-linear form, by using the square of the dominant 
airline’s share (CR1). Our point is that Lerner indexes may decrease more when the dominant 
airline has larger markets shares.  
                                                           
8 As an example, Competition Commission (2008) states that in the years before 2007/2008, BAA  priced to the 
maximum allowed at Heathrow and Gatwick, but below the maximum at Stansted. 
9 Other factors are related to our control variables and are explained in the next section. 
10 However, as explained in the text other variants were regressed. Results of one of them are also reported in 
Table 1. Others are not reported to save space. However results are available upon request.  
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As dependent variable we used the Lerner index (L), computed as the ratio of the price minus 
marginal cost to the price.
11 For the price, we used the aeronautical revenues per passenger, 
and for marginal cost we used variable costs per passenger. As independent variables we used 
the following (the rationales and expected signs of which are based on the theoretical model): 
CR1: the share of the dominant airline (which, in our sample, ranges between 0.115 and 
0.855, with a median of 0,375). The expected sign is negative; 
CONC: a dummy that takes the value of “1” if there is another airport less than a hundred 
kilometers from a certain airport, and “0” otherwise. It intends to capture competition in the 
upstream market and its expected sign is negative (more competition decreases the Lerner 
index); 
PAX:  number  of  passengers  (in  millions).  This  variable  is  used  to  test  the  impact  of 
economies of scale in the long run. According to our theoretical model, the expected sign is 
negative. 
WAR: the proportion of aeronautical revenues. The expected sign is negative; 
INT: The share of international passengers. This variable is a proxy for the airlines’ price 
elasticity of demand. The expected sign is positive; 
PTER:  number  of  passengers  per  square  meter  of  terminal  area.  This  variable  tests  the 
existence of economies of density. The expected sign is negative; 
LCC: a dummy that assumes the value of “1” if the dominant airline is a LCC, and of “0” 
otherwise. The expected sign is negative; 
OWN: a dummy that takes the value of “1” if the majority of the airport’s capital is state-
owned, LCC, and of “0” otherwise. The expected sign is negative; 
EUR: a dummy that is equal to “1” if the airport is located in Europe and “0” otherwise. 
 
The results confirm that the share of the dominant airline has a negative influence on the 
Lerner  index.  Equation  (1)  in  Table  1  shows  that  CR1  is  significant  at  5%,  and  that  an 
increase in this market share of 10 percentual points decreases the Lerner index by 2.3 basis 
points, which means a decrease above 2.3% if we take into consideration that the theoretical 
                                                           
11 As robustness test we also use the operating margin as dependent variable. The essence of our conclusions, 
namely regarding the negative impact of CR1 and CR1
2, remains the same.      
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maximum value for the Lerner index is 1.0 and a decrease of 5.5% if you take as a starting 
point a Lerner index equal the median of our sample (0.41).  
 
- Insert Table 1 - 
 
The variable CR1 acquires a higher significance if it takes a square form, instead of a linear 
one. Equation [2] shows that CR1
2 is significant also at 5% (however, the p-value of CR1 
coefficient is 4.8% and the p-value for the CR1
2 coefficient is 2.5%).
12 Thus higher values of 
CR1  have  a  greater  impact  on  decreasing  L  than  small  ones.  We  thus  confirm  that,  as 
expected, and given the results of our theoretical model, a high market power of a leader 
downstream firm reduces the upstream firm’s market power.  
With regard to our control variables, the results show that CONC is always significant at 1%, 
meaning that the presence of a competitor decreases the Lerner index, as expected. WAR is 
significant at 5% and has a negative coefficient. Thus, the higher the share of aeronautical 
revenues,  the  lower  the  airports’  Lerner  index.  Airports  with  higher  shares  of  concession 
revenues  have  higher  market  power.  LCC  is  significant  at  5%  (p-value  is  3.1%),  which 
confirms the negative impact of the dominance of a low cost carrier on the airports’ Lerner 
index. In fact, our results point to the fact that when the dominant carrier is a  LCC, the 
airport’s market power is lower by about 0.085, which means ceteris paribus a decrease of 
8.5% in the airport margin (price minus marginal cost) relatively to the price when compared 
to the situation of dominance of full service carriers.   
The variable PTER is significant at 10% and its coefficient has a negative sign. This confirms 
our theoretical point (see Section 2). Indeed, in airports, as may happen in other networks, 
economies  of  density  exist,  but  not  economies  of  scale.  In  fact,  the  variable  PAX  is  not 
significant. 
INT is not significant. We expected that airlines would be more willing to support higher 
margins  in  the  airports  with  more  international  passengers  than  in  airports  that  are  more 
dedicated  to  domestic  flights.  However,  this  variable  is  not  significant.  Given  that, 
theoretically, long and short-haul passengers can have different willingness to pay, we keep 
                                                           




this variable in our regressions. However, if we exclude it other explanatory variables remain 
significant (see regression [3]).  
Finally, variable OWN is significant (its p-value is around 7%), and has a negative sign, 
revealing that, ceteris paribus, airports owned by the state have lower Lerner indexes in 0.09 
than the others. This difference represents 22.2% of the median Lerner index.  
In sum, our model seems to behave quite well, as most variables are significant and have the 
expected sign. The empirical results clearly show that market concentration of downstream 
buyers’ squeezes the upstream suppliers’ market power. 
 
3.3. Causality tests 
 
We  concluded  that  a  larger  share  of  the  dominant  airline  negatively  influences  airports’ 
market  power  (Lerner  indexes).  Though  regulators  set  price  caps  or  other  forms  of  price 
regulation, there is a margin of choice for the airports, and, within this margin, downstream 
market power tends to lower the airports’ price margins. Also, dominant airlines lobbying 
during the process of regulation leads to lower airport prices and so to lower Lerner indexes. 
But it might be worth questioning if the Lerner indexes of airports influence the dominant 
airline’s  market  share.  In  other  words,  the  question  is:  if  regulators,  while  influenced  by 
airlines’ lobbying, do not also influence their dominance at a particular airport. For instance, 
if the regulator sets a low cap, will this lead to higher dominant airlines’ market shares?  
This is the same as asking which direction causality works. We showed that CR1 influences 
L. But does L influence CR1? A priori there are no factors that unambiguously support this 
influence. We could think that airlines might switch from an airport that has a higher price to 
another that has a lower price. But dominant airlines use “their” airports as hubs and have 
often made specific investments there, and so switching on account of lower airports’ margins 
would have high transaction costs
13. Our causality test intends to detect if switching is current, 
or if, on the contrary, it is difficult because of transaction costs and specific investments and, 
consequently, airlines prefer to lobby for lower prices with regulators and airports. 
We performed the Hausman test to check for causality. The Hausman test is appropriate for 
cross section data, where Granger causality tests cannot be applied. 
                                                           
13 Though transaction costs may also be small whenever an airline has a minimum of specific investments in an 
airport, as happens with some low cost carriers.  
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To carry out the Hausman test we ran two OLS regressions. In the first step regressions, we 
regressed the suspect variable (CR1 or CR1
2) on a set of instrumental variables that are not 
correlated with the error term of the respective equation ([1], [2] or [3] ) and which we present 
in the Table 1. In the set of explanatory variables (as CONC, PAX, WAR, LCC, INT, EUR, 
PTER and OWN), we also include the average revenue per passenger (ARPP).
14 All variables 
have reduced correlation with the errors of the original equations.
15 
In the second step regressions, we re-estimate the regressions [1], [2] and [3] including the 
residuals from the first regression as additional regressors. The results are in Table 2.
16  
-  Insert Table 2 - 
For all equations [1], [2] and [3], the coefficients on the first stage residuals do not differ 




This papers deals with the limitation of upstream market power by a downstream market 
leader. Studies on this subject are scarce and limited. The purpose of this paper is twofold. 
First  we  build  up  a  theoretically  framework  to  understand  the  relationship  between  the 
upstream market power and the downstream leader’s market share, applicable for regulated 
firms.  Second,  we  develop  and  empirical  study  (using  a  large  sample  of  airports),  the 
hypotheses of which are based on our theoretical work.  
According to the results of our theoretical model, we find that the market share of a leader 
downstream firm is significant in explaining the upstream producers’ Lerner indexes. Thus, 
our results support the idea that the higher the market share of the downstream buyer, the 
smaller  the  degree  of  “capture”  of  the  regulator  by  the  regulated  upstream  firm.  Also  in 
accordance with the results of the theoretical model, we find a positive influence on upstream 
market power of economies of density, of public ownership, of upstream competition, of the 
                                                           
14 If this variable is not included, and thus we only include as regressors the other original independent variables, 
the conclusions remain unchangeable 
15 For equation [1], for example, the correlation with the errors ranges between -0.30 (ARPP) and 0.15 (LCC). 
16  To  save  space,  we  only  include  the  results  for  the  additional  regressor  (i.e.,  the  residuals  from  the  first 
regressions),  since  only  this  variable  is  relevant  to  achieve  the  Hausman  test’s  conclusions.  However,  the 
coefficients and p-values for other regressors are available upon request.  
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percentage of the main (aeronautical) revenues) and of the dominance of low cost carriers.  
These are the factors that may depress airports’ market power. 
Theoretically,  we  must  admit  that  upstream  firms’  regulators  could  influence  airlines’ 
dominance  at  each  airport,  through  their  decisions  on  airport  prices.  If  this  happens,  a 
downstream  leader’s  market  share  should  be  endogenously  determined  together  with  the 
upstream producer’s Lerner index. However, applying the Hausman test, we find no evidence 
of endogeneity. Thus we can conclude that our results support the idea that dominant airlines 
successfully exercise lobbying to influence the regulators, but the regulator’s decisions on 
prices  do  not  influence  airlines’  dominance  at  each  airport.  These  findings  underline  the 
strategic importance of the lobbying process of the downstream buyers (that are not directly 
regulated) in influencing the market power of their (regulated) upstream suppliers, and in 
avoiding  the  consequences  of  upstream  regulators’  decisions  on  their  own  quantities  and 
market share.  
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TABLE 1 - OLS REGRESSIONS  
 
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the Lerner index (L) of the upstream airport; (ii) 
***, ** and * show statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, (one-sided tests). 
 
 
TABLE 2 – HAUSMAN TEST’S SECOND STAGE REGRESSIONS  
 
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the Lerner index (L) of the upstream airport; (ii) Besides the First Stage 
Residuals also included as regressors were all independent variables included in the corresponding regression of 
the Table 1, ie, CR1 (regressions [1] and [3]), CR12 (regressions [2]), INT (regressions [1] and [2]) and CONC, 
PAX, WAR, PTER, LCC, OWN and EUR (all regressions); (iii) p-values refer to two-sided tests. 
 
   
C 0.844 *** 0.802 *** 0.877 ***
CR1 -0.227 ** -0.238 **
CR1
2 -0.269 **
CONC -0.130 *** -0.128 *** -0.129 ***
PAX 1.310 * 1.411 * 1.466 *
WAR -0.350 ** -0.355 ** -0.345 **
INT 0.084 0.079
PTER -0.353 ** -0.358 ** -0.395 **
LCC -0.085 ** -0.085 ** -0.096 ***
OWN -0.091 ** -0.089 ** -0.102 **
EUR -0.116 ** -0.115 * -0.072 **
N 106 106 106
R-squared 0.287 0.291 0.279
[1] [2] [3]
Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value
First Stage Residuals  0.021 0.252 0.000 0.790 0.000 0.962
N 106 106
R-squared 0.297 0.288 0.279
Regression [1] Regression [2] Regression [3] 
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Appendix: List of Airports 
Albuquerque    Kansas City 
Aukland    Orlando 
Albany    Chicago Midwest 
Amsterdam    Melbourne 
Stockholm Arlanda    Memphis 
Athens    Macau 
Atlanta    Miami 
Austin    Milwaukee General Mitchell 
Barcelona    Malta 
Bangkok    Minneapolis St Paul 
Nashville    New Orleans Louis Armstrong 
Brisbane    Munich 
Bombay    Tokyo Narita 
Boston    Oakland 
Brussels    Ontario 
Baltimore    Chicago O'Hare 
Bai Yun    Oslo 
Paris CDG    Palm Beach 
Jakarta    Portland 
Cleveland    Beijing 
Charlotte Douglas    Penang 
Cairns    Perth 
Copenhagen    Philadelphia 
Cincinnati North Kentucky    Phoenix 
Washington Ronald Reagan    Pittsburg 
Dehli    Shanghai Pudong 
Denver    Raleigh-Durham 
Dallas Fort Worth    Richmond 
Detroit    Riga 
Dublin    Reno 
Dusseldorf    San Diego 
Edinburgh    San Antonio 
Newark    Louisville 
Rome Fiumicino    Seattle 
Fort lauderdale    Seoul Gimpo 
Frankfurt    San Francisco 
Geneva    Shanghai Hongqiao 
Helsinki    Singapore 
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Hong Kong     San Jose 
Honolulu    Salt Lake City 
Washington Dulles    Sacramento 
Houston-Bush    John Wayne Orange County 
Seoul Incheon    Saint Louis Lambert 
Indianapolis    London Stansted 
Istanbul    Sydney 
Jacksonville    Shenzhen Baoan  
New York JFK    Tallinn 
Kansai    Tampa 
Kuala Lumpur    Taipei 
Las Vegas    Berlin Tegel 
Los Angeles    Vienna 
New York La Guardia    Ottawa 
London Gatwick    Montreal 
London Heathrow    Vancouver 
Lisbon    Calgary 
Madrid    Zurich 
Manchester      
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